Introduction to Electronic Commerce



Group 1 Szarkowska Magdalena Pierczynski Grzegorz 20.03.2017 08.05.2017
Group 2 Łabęcki Łukasz Rymarz Piotr 13.03.2017 24.04.2017
Group 3 Graczykowski Michał Poskrobko Paweł 13.03.2017 05.06.2017
Group 4 Banaszkiewicz Michał Knopik Tomasz 20.03.2017 05.06.2017
Group 5 Konefał Grzegorz Kopański Jan 27.03.2017 15.05.2017
Group 6 Izert Piotr Woźnica Piotr 06.03.2017 10.04.2017
Group 7 Okrasa Michał Maczkowska Marta 06.03.2017 24.04.2017
Group 8 Józefowicz Zuzanna Milewski Jakub 03.04.2017 08.05.2017
Group 9 Kończyk Marcin Retyk Michał 10.04.2017 22.05.2017
Group 10 Sienkiewicz Paweł Preibisch Michał 03.04.2017 22.05.2017
Group 11 Baranowski Maciej Zaręba Mariusz 27.03.2017 15.05.2017


Lecture 01 (27.02.2017) INTRODUCTION



Lecture 02 (06.03.2017) COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE


Group 7 Okrasa Michał Maczkowska Marta
"Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to SocialChoice"
Group 6 Izert Piotr Woźnica Piotr 
Y. Chevaleyre et al. A Short Introduction to Computational SocialChoice. Proc. SOFSEM-2007, Springer-Verlag, 2007.


Lecture 03 (13.03.2017) ARROW'S THEOREM & BEYOND


Group 2 Łabęcki Łukasz Rymarz Piotr
Computer Aided Proof of Arrow's Theorem
Group 3  Graczykowski Michał Poskrobko Paweł
A Straightforward Proof of Arrow's Theorem


Lecture 04 (20.03.2017) MECHANISM DESIGN - INTRODUCTION


Group 1 Szarkowska Magdalena Pierczynski Grzegorz
  Capital in the XXI century by Piketty
Group 4 Banaszkiewicz Michał Knopik Tomasz 
A Simple Proof of Gibbard-Satherwhite Theorem


Lecture 05 (27.03.2017) MECHANISM DESIGN - CONT.


Group 5 Konefał Grzegorz Kopański Jan
Girvan-Newman algorithm
Group 11 Baranowski Maciej  Zaręba Mariusz
J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. Computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989.


The material for lectures 03, 04, and 05 can be found in the Nisan N., "Introduction to Mechanism Design for Computer Scientists"


Lecture 06 (03.04.2017) REVELATION PRINCIPLE


Group 8 Józefowicz Zuzanna Milewski Jakub
Babaioff et al. "Impersonation-Based Mechanism"
Group 10 Sienkiewicz Paweł Preibisch Michał
Criticism of Piketty
also read text1 and other sources from the internet about the 26-yo graduate who challenged Piketty


Lecture 07 (10.04.2017) AUCTION FORMATS


Group 11 Kończyk Marcin  Retyk Michał

"Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats" by K

Group 6 Izert Piotr Woźnica Piotr
"Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions" by Kate Larson



Lecture 08 (24.04.2017) AUCTIONS WITH EXTERNALITIES


Group 7 Okrasa Michał Maczkowska Marta
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu, and E. Stacchetti. How (not) to sell nuclear weapons. Amer. Econ. Review, 86(4):814–29, 1996
Group 2 Łabęcki Łukasz Rymarz Piotr
The biggest auction ever...


Lecture 09 (08.05.2017) GARRY BECKER


Group 8 Józefowicz Zuzanna
Milewski Jakub
Children + Krytyka Garego Beckera
Group 5 Konefał Grzegorz Kopański Jan



Lecture 10 (15.05.2016) TRUTH REVELATION IN APPROX. EFFICIENT COMB. AUCTIONS


Group 1 Szarkowska Magdalena Pierczynski Grzegorz
http://www.dbc.wroc.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=24918
Group13 Grycuk Maria












Lecture 11 (22.05.2016) POWER INDICES


Group 3



Dynamic weighted voting games

Group 7

Wojtek Mandrysz

Maciej Kieroń

Sekcja o "Generating functions" z

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp644.pdf

Lecture 12 (30.05.2016) GRAPH-RESTRICTED POWER INDICES


Group 2

Bartosz Szopa

Piotr Kozłowski

The cost of principles

Group 9

Krzysztof Imianowski

Wojciech Rybak

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.05342v2.pdf


Lecture 13 (6.06.2016) ROBERT'S THEOREM


Group 12 Anna Persona Konrad Sloniewski
Ethics in self-driving cars.
Group 13 Krzysztof Pachacz Krzysztof Kiewicz
The model description and the key findings from here.


Lecture 14 (13.06.2016) TBA


Group 12    



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